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Summary 
Never before the nineteenth century had Europeans, especially in the South, adopted 
sanitary cordons so intensely or at such a fast rate. This article aims to analyse the process 
of rationalisation and militarisation of sanitary cordons carried out in the anti-epidemic 
fight during the nineteenth century in the Mediterranean island of Mallorca (Spain). These 
cordons should be understood as a declaration of war by the authorities on emerging 
epidemics. They could generate intolerably significant mortality crises which the new 
liberal citizenship found unacceptable. Toleration of this type of measures was the result 
of a general consensus, with hardly any opposition, which not only obtained the support 
of scientists (especially from the medical class) but also of most of the local and provincial 
political elite, and even of the population at large. 
Keywords: Sanitary cordons, Epidemics, Liberal State, Rationalisation, Militarisation. 
Sanitary cordons, understood as extreme and exceptional forms of land and sea 
isolation in the face of an epidemic threat, were not an invention of the process of 
nineteenth-century sanitary modernisation but were part of the general programme of 
social and political change that it entailed.1 Never before had this type of measure been 
adopted so intensely or at such a fast rate in Southern Europe.2 These actions could have 
been triggered by a complex set of circumstances. 
1 Following Teresa Carnero, 'Introducción', in T. Carnero (ed.), Modernización, desarrollo 
político y cambio social [Modernisation, political development and social change] (Madrid: 
Alianza, 1992), 9-34, we understand modernisation as a process of social change, in which 
transformations in the productive sphere and in the social structure within which they take place 
in the field of politics and the administration are combined, without these being related 
mechanically. Therefore, the process refers both to the development of capitalism and the new 
liberal state, with a great infrastructural capacity to intervene in society, see Michael Mann, The 
Sources of Social Power, vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
2 Regarding this issue see Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘El resguardo de la salud. Organización 
sanitaria española en el siglo XVIII’ [Safeguarding health. Spanish sanitary organization in the 
eighteenth century)], Dynamis, 7-8 (1987-88), 145-170 and Joaquim Bonastra Tolós, 
‘Innovaciones y continuismo en las concepciones sobre el contagio y las cuarentenas en la España 
del siglo XIX. Reflexiones acerca de un problema sanitario, económico y social’ [Innovations and 
continuity in conceptions regarding contagion and quarantines in nineteenth century Spain. 
Reflections on a sanitary, economic and social issue], Scripta Nova. Revista de Geografía y 
Ciencias Sociales, 69 (2000), www.ub.es/geocrit/nova-ig.htm or Eugenia Tognotti, ‘Lessons 
from the History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A’, Historical Review, 19, 2 (2013), 
254-259. Both authors not only highlight the continuities, but also the innovations put into 
practice during the nineteenth century. 
Amongst these, it is worth noting that there was a perceived rise in the risk of 
epidemics associated with increases in international commercial traffic between 
European regions, from tropical areas and in general from East to West. Furthermore, 
Southern Europeans were anxious about their proximity to areas considered much less 
salubrious, such as North Africa and the Islamic countries in the Eastern Mediterranean.3 
For this reason, cordons as prophylactic measures were more commonly used by 
nineteenth-century Mediterranean nations and colonies, e.g., Naples, Sardinia, Venice, 
Spain, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt and Gibraltar, than by nations in the Atlantic regions.4 This 
generalisation of the use of cordons could be explained also by the fact that, due to the 
importance of trade for Mediterranean areas, countries in Southern Europe preferred 
bearing the costs of a temporary closure of commercial activity to carrying out the more 
costly profound public reforms that they were in need of.5 This system would be 
                                                          
3 Evidently we follow the theses of Peter Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe 1830 - 1930 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) regarding this point. 
4 See for Naples: Frank M. Snowden, Naples in the Time of Cholera 1884-1911 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); for Sardinia Norma Howard-Jones, The Scientific 
Background of the International Sanitary Conferences 1851-1938, (Geneva: World Health 
Organisation, 1975); for Venice: Eugenia Tognotti, ‘Lessons from the History of Quarantine, 
from Plague to Influenza A’, Historical Review, 19, 2 (2013), 254-259 and Eugenia Tognotti, 
‘The Origins of the Health Defence System Against Contagious Illness: The Strategies of 
Isolation and Quarantine in Mediterranean Cities from the XIV-XIX Centuries’, Alder Museum 
bulletin, 31, 1 (2005), 6-17; for Spain, it is interesting to highlight the example of the cities of 
Alacant or Barcelona, both Mediterranean cities, due to their concomitant use of sanitary cordons 
with Mallorca at the beginning of the nineteenth century. See: Salvador Salort Vives, ‘Town 
planning, economy and health: Alacant’s harbour, from a death lake into a modern harbour (1900-
1914)’, Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos Españoles, 45 (2007), 423-425 or Mercedes 
Pascual Artiaga ‘La ciudad ante el contagio: medidas políticas y administrativas dictadas en la 
epidemia de fiebre amarilla de 1804 en Alicante’ [The city facing the contagion: political and 
administrative measures adopted in the yellow fever epidemic of 1804 in Alicante], Asclepio, 54,1 
(2002), 125-154 and Francesc Bonamusa and Joan Serrallonga, Del roig al groc. Barcelona, 
1868-1871. Quintes i epidèmies (Barcelona: L'Avenç, 1995) [From red to yellow: Barcelona, 
1868-1871. Epidemics and conscripts] or Joan Serrallonga Urquidi, ‘Epidemias e historia social. 
Apuntes sobre el cólera en España, 1833-1865’ [Epidemics and Social History. Notes on Cholera 
in Spain, 1833-1865.], Historia Social, 1996, 24, 7-21. However, the practice of this quarantinist 
measure was found around the whole coast of Spain, as the seminal works on the study of cholera 
across nineteenth-century Spain report, consult: Jose Maria Lopez Piñero, Luis Garcia Ballester 
and Pilar Faus Sevilla: Medicina y sociedad en la España del siglo XIX [Medicine and society in 
the nineteenth-century Spain], Madrid, Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1964, or Juan J. 
Fernández Sanz: El año de la vacunación de Ferran. Trasfondo político, médico, 
sociodemográfico y económica de una epidemia [The year of the vaccination of Ferrán. Political, 
medical, sociodemographic and economic backdrop of an epidemic], Madrid, Fundación Ramón 
Areces, 1990. For Portugal, see Maria Antónia Pires de Almeida, ‘Fighting disease and epidemics: 
Ricardo Jorge and the internationalization of Portuguese science’, Vesalius: acta internationales 
historiae medicinae, 19, 1 (2013), 19-23. For Malta, Cyprus, and Gibraltar, Baldwin can be 
checked, op. cit. (note 1) and for Egypt, Paul Slack, Plague. A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012). It is worth mentioning that the introduction of sanitary cordons 
in Egypt was part of Muhammad Ali’s modernisation reforms, a purpose completely different 
from the above-mentioned use of cordons as palliative measures in fighting against epidemics in 
regions where important sanitary reforms were not yet introduced, as some sources in the 
bibliography stated. 
5 On this statement, see Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña, ‘La salud publica en España en el contexto 
europeo, 1890-1925’ [Public health in Spain in the European context, 1890 – 1925], Revista de 
completely different6 from the one applied, for instance, in England7 due to the geo-
epidemiology of disease, which refers, in terms of geography, to the proximity to areas 
where cholera or other contagious diseases originated.8 Nevertheless, the use of cordons 
in Southern Europe declined as scientific evidence based on microbiological analysis 
advanced.  
Moreover, citizens considered cordons reliable measures for avoiding epidemics 
due to their past success in fighting against plague and because of the persistence of 
contagionism as a medical theory endorsing their adoption.9 The First International 
Sanitary Conference (1851) might have reinforced this idea when, among other 
statements, it concluded that quarantines set up in islands or peninsulas could be more 
effective against epidemics than those set up in the continental inland because they were 
well-delimited spaces.10 However, a new epidemic cycle appeared from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century with yellow fever and cholera, and plague reappeared. Lastly, it 
could be argued that, in general, the new nation-states were much more capable – and 
interested – in the mobilisation of material and human resources than the previous 
absolutist states. This was due to a greater and more intensive infrastructural power and, 
of course, to the institutionalisation of citizenship. 11 
Thus, in the words of Michael Mann12, we were witnessing the birth of a mixed 
State, capable of intervening in the civilian sphere, especially from the second half of the 
nineteenth century on. Although town councils were institutions in charge of health 
                                                          
Sanidad e Higiene Pública, 68 (1994), 11-27; Snowden, op. cit (note 6) and Baldwin, op. cit. 
(note 1). 
6 For this topic, see Alexander Chase-Levenson, ‘Early Nineteenth-Century Mediterranean 
Quarantine as a European System’ in Alison Bashford (Ed.) Quarantine. Local & Global Histories 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 35-53. 
7 Krista Maglen, ‘The first line of defence…’ The English System: Quarantine, Immigration and 
the Making of a Port Sanitary Zone (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 21-59. 
8 As Baldwin, op. cit., 211-212 (note 1).  
9 As demonstrated in the discussions at the International Sanitary Conferences, as can be seen in 
Mark Harrison, ‘Disease, Diplomacy and International Commerce: the Origins of International 
Sanitary Regulation in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Global History, 1 (2006), 197-217 
and Valeska Huber, ‘The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary 
Conferences on Cholera, 1851-1894’, The Historical Journal, 49, 2 (2006), 453-476. Meanwhile, 
Eugenia Tognotti, ‘Lessons from the History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A’, 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 19 (2013), 254-259 defends the idea that the local authorities were 
reluctant to abandon the quarantine systems and sanitary cordons, even in areas where their 
efficacy was most doubtful, given the false sensation of safety they inspired among the 
population.  
10 Baldwin, op. cit. (note 1). 
11 Patrice Bourdelais, Les épidémies terrassées. Une historie des pays riches [Defeated 
Epidemics: A tale of rich countries] (Paris: Éditions de La Martinière, 2003) defends that it is was 
precisely the State's ever stronger intervention in favour of health which explains the substantial 
improvements therein between 1859 and 1940, a period in which they went from being a 
government imposition to being a demand by citizens. Also see: Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital 
and European States A D 990-1992 (Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1990); Claude 
Lefort, ‘Les Droits de l’homme et l’Etat-Providence’ [Human Rights and the Welfare State], 
Esprit, 108, 11, (1985), 65–79 or Patrick Zylberman, Tempêtes microbiennes – Essai sur la 
politique de sécurité sanitaire dans le monde transatlàntiques [Microbian turmoils: Essay on 
health and safety policies in the transatlantic world] (Paris: Gallimard, 2013). 
12 Mann, op. cit. (note 2). See also Raphael, op. cit. (note 21). 
issues, this authority was legally delegated by the central government.13 Even the regular 
army, which was the result of the new national State, took on civilian functions that were 
different from its traditional, exclusively military, roles. In this way, their capacity to 
respond to sanitary disasters increased, despite their limitations, especially in the case of 
Spain, and the limitations of medical science at the time.14 The centralisation of health 
care was just one of the corollaries, which in Spain was established by the General Health 
Law of 1855,15 although it certainly had important precedents. Hence, Spain’s policy for 
epidemic prevention evolved from focusing on the single aim of isolation to a much more 
complex prophylactic policy. To these isolationist measures were added other preventive 
actions, such as urban hygiene.  
The onset of this change appeared upon the death of Ferdinand VII of Spain 
(1833)16 and was largely sanctioned by the General Health Law of 1855.17 In no cases 
were cordons forbidden but, rather, an attempt was made to regulate their use and abuse, 
and they were placed under central government control and removed from the control of 
provincial or local governments.18 
This study aims to show, through an analysis of the case of the island of Mallorca, 
the generalisation and prevalence of sanitary cordons and how they contributed to the 
fight against epidemics in the nineteenth century. The scientific postulates at the time 
were derived from contagionist theory but, by the end of the period, they were adapted to 
                                                          
13 Joaquín del Moral Ruíz, 'Las funciones del Estado y la articulación del territorio nacional: 
símbolos, administración pública y servicios' [The functions of the State and the articulation of 
national territory: symbols, public administration and services], in J. d. Moral Ruíz, J. Pro Ruiz 
and F. Suárez Bilbao (eds.), Estado y territorio en España, 1820-1930. La formación del paisaje 
nacional [State and territory in Spain, 1820-1930. The formation of the national landscape] 
(Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, 2007), 17-358 
14 For Eric L. Jones, Crecimiento recurrente. El cambio económico en la historia mundial. 
[Growth recurring: Economic Change in World History] (Madrid: Alianza, 1997), 218: the most 
important factor was an increase in the number of bureaucrats who could devote themselves to 
rationalising the struggle against disasters, including epidemics, thus reducing their effects 
15 However, note that enforcement of the law was left in the hands of the delegations and councils, 
a situation similar to what is described by Swaan, In Care of the State, for Great Britain.  
16 Carles Grabuleda Teixidor, ‘Salut pública i creixement urbà. Política i acció social en el 
sorgiment de la Barcelona Contemporània’ [Public health and urban growth. Politics and social 
action in the rise of Contemporary Barcelona], (unpublished PhD thesis: Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra, 2002); Esteban Rodríguez Ocaña and Ferrán Martínez Navarro, Salud pública en España: 
de la Edad Media al siglo XXI [Public Health in Spain from medieval times to the twenty-first 
century] (Granada: Escuela Andaluza de Salud Pública, 2008). Likewise, the Royal Orders of 24 
August 1834 and 31 August 1854 quoted by Joana Maria Pujadas-Mora, ‘Les epidèmies 
"invisibles" i "visibles" de còlera a la Ciutat de Palma: gestió municipal, Segle XIX’ [The 
“invisible” and “visible” epidemics of cholera in the City of Palma: municipal management 
(nineteenth century)] (unpublished PhD thesis: Universitat de les Illes Balears, 2005). 
17 It must be noted that this law does not stand against isolation measures in themselves but rather 
against the perversion of the system, especially in the use of land cordons (Juan José Fernández 
Sanz, El año de la vacunación de Ferrán. Trasfondo político, médico, sociodemográfico y 
económico de una epidemia (Madrid: Fundación Ramón Aceres, 1990). 
18 Pujadas Mora, ‘Les epidèmies "invisibles" i "visibles" de còlera a la ciutat de Palma’ [and Joana 
Maria Pujadas-Mora, ‘La gestión municipal de las epidemias de cólera en Palma (Mallorca) 
durante el siglo XIX: “Epidemias invisibles” ’ [Municipal management of cholera epidemcis in 
Palma (Mallorca) during the nineteenth century]: “Invisible epidemics, in J. M. Beascoechea 
Gangoiti, M. González Portilla and P. A. Novo López (eds.), La ciudad contemporánea, espacio 
y sociedad [The contemporary city, space and society] (Bilbao - Puebla: Servicio Editorial 
Universidad del País Vasco - Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2006), 291-310. 
the bacteriological approach.19 Moreover, the new liberal governments overcame the 
dichotomy between freedom and coercion in favour of the latter, continuing to perform 
the classic duties of absolute states while preserving the rights of citizenship and adding 
new duties such as the preservation of life and the provision of a healthy environment. 20  
Our starting hypothesis is that the use of sanitary cordons was not contrary to the 
main economic interests of the island, nor was it the subject of ideological debate, except 
for their use inland.21 On the contrary, they contained an essential element for the 
development of commercial capitalism, which, parallel with political liberalism, was 
growing stronger and stronger in this area of the Western Mediterranean. 22 Lastly, and in 
relation to these assumptions, it can be observed how, as the century progresses, the 
cordons were adapted and organised in line with the process of political, administrative 
and economic modernisation. Specifically, a coercive measure such as this must have the 
support of the army. For this reason, we believe that the use of sanitary cordons and 
quarantines without a progressive militarisation of society would be inconceivable. They 
required either a permanent army that presupposed compulsory military service or 
security and surveillance forces such as the Carabineros [paramilitary gendarmerie] 
(since 1829), the Guardia Civil [Spanish military police] (created in 1844) or the local 
police in Palma since 1852. 23 
                                                          
19 Especially as regards the identification of a causal agent for each illness, thus making the 
microbe the new enemy and not so much the ill person (Josep Lluís Barona Vilar, Salud, 
enfermedad y muerte [Health, illness and death] (València: Diputació de València. Institució 
Alfons el Magnànim, 2002)).  
20Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 
1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 627-635.  
21 We do not assume, therefore, a direct relationship between liberalism and anticontagionism, or 
between contagionist measures and commercial interests, along the lines pointed out by Baldwin, 
Contagion and the State unlike what Erwin H. Ackerknecht ‘Anticontagionism between 1821 and 
1867’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 22 (1948), 532-593 claimed. For this topic see also 
Christopher Hamlin, ‘Commentary: Ackerknecht and ‘Anticontagionism’: a tale of two 
dichotomies’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 38 (2009), 22-27.  
22 Our study is based on the belief that the State resulting from the liberal revolution in Spain did 
have the ability to promote social and economic modernisation. Therefore, our thesis promotes 
the idea that, within the European context, Spain was unusual, as pointed out by Fernando Molina 
Aparicio and Miguel Cabo Villaverde, ‘Historiografia i nacionalització a Espanya. Reflexions 
finals’ [Historiography and nationalization in Spain. Final reflections], Segle XX. Revista catalana 
d'història, 4 (2011), 161-169 and Salvador Calatayud, Jesús Millan and Maria Cruz Romeo, ‘El 
Estado en la configuración de la España contemporánea. Una revisión de los problemas 
historiográficos’ [The State in the configuration of contemporary Spain. A review of 
historiographic problems], in S. Calatayud, J. Millan and M. Cruz Romeo, eds, Estado y periferias 
en la España del siglo XX. Nuevos enfoques [State and peripheries in 20th century Spain. New 
approaches] (València: Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2009), 9-130. 
Regarding capitalist development in Mallorca and its integration in the process of economic 
globalisation, our ideas are based on the contributions of Carles Manera Erbina, Història del 
creixement econòmic a Mallorca (1700-2000) [History of economic growth in Mallorca (1700-
2000)] (Palma de Mallorca: Lleonard Muntaner, 2001) and Ramon Molina de Dios, Treball 
intensiu, treballadors polivalents (Treball, salaris i cost de vida, Mallorca, 1860-1936) [Work, 
salaries and cost of living) Mallorca, 1860-1936] (Palma de Mallorca: Conselleria d'Economia, 
Comerç i Indústria, 2003).  
23 Among other studies see, for the Spanish case, Fernado Puell de la Villa, Historia del ejército 
en España [History of the Spanish army] (Madrid: Alianza, 2000) and, for a general view, Charles 
Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 
1990). 
The sources we used were basically local and regional. As there are no 
documentary series covering the whole period under study, nor centralised documentation 
on this issue, we set up a database by compiling information from various archives. From 
the municipal field, we analysed the series entitled Health-orders, which includes orders 
from the higher echelons of power to the mayors of Mallorcan towns, from 1784 to 1870. 
Also in the towns, health news items appearing in municipal records – a type of 
documentation that presents a constant series throughout the whole century and 
consultation of which is very time-consuming – were also consulted. Lastly, the 
information kept since 1854 in the Archive of the Consell de Mallorca, heir of the former 
Provincial Delegation, was of great interest.24 This institution was in charge of organising 
the sanitary cordons, even though these cordons required the cooperation of the town 
councils25 and the approval and participation of the army and, of course, the Ministry of 
the Interior [Gobernación in Spanish].26 Because of this, it is possible to transcend the 
scattered and fragmented documentation referring to this issue, and the perspectives of 
different administrations and occasionally opposing interests can, in turn, be compared. 




Rationalisation and militarisation of the cordons 
 
In the island of Mallorca between 1787 and 1899 a total of twenty-eight land 
defensive rings were set up in order to guard the whole of the island perimeter intensively 
from land, with the support of coastguard boats. This meant an average of one cordon 
every four years, with greater intensity in the first half of the century. Simultaneously, 
ordinary protection systems and sanitary surveillance were increased and rationalised at 
ports. This preventive policy was due to three epidemic threats: the plague, yellow fever 
                                                          
24 The Provincial Delegation is an elective institution, presided over by the governor until 1870, 
dating back to the Constitution of 1812. Its functions are exercised over the whole provincial 
territory – in this case the Balearic Islands. It has an administrative, collaborative and supervisory 
nature.  
25 In fact, as was common in Europe at that time, the administrative practice and application of a 
large body of the legal corpus depended on municipal administration and on its revenue offices. 
For the Spanish case, see Pedro Carasa Soto (ed.), Ayuntamiento, Estado y Sociedad. Los poderes 
municipales en la España contemporánea [Council, State and Society. Municipal powers in 
contemporary Spain] (Valladolid: Fundación Municipal de Cultura - Instituto de Historia 
"Simancas", 2000) and Joaquín del Moral Ruíz, ‘Las funciones del Estado y la articulación del 
territorio nacional: símbolos, administración pública y servicios’, in J. d. Moral Ruíz, J. Pro Ruiz 
and F. Suárez Bilbao (eds.), Estado y territorio en España, 1820-1930. La formación del paisaje 
nacional (Madrid: Los libros de la Catarata, 2007), 17-358. Meanwhile, Abram de Swaan, In 
Care of the State. Health Care, Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA in the Modern Era 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. II: The Rise of Classes 
and Nation-States, 1760-1914; and Lutz Raphael, Ley y orden. Dominación mediante la 
administración en el siglo XIX [Law and order. Dominance through the administration in the 19th 
century ] (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 2008), highlight the great importance of the town councils in the 
development of public administration in Western Europe during the second half of the nineteenth 
century; although in all cases they act as delegates of the central State. 
26 Joan Serrallonga Urquidi, ‘Epidemias e historia social. Apuntes sobre el cólera en España, 
1833-1865’, Historia Social, 24 (1996), 7-21, had already pointed out the fact that in Italy and 
Spain all health policies depended ultimately on the Ministry of the Interior, also in charge of 
internal security and with a clear centralising purpose. 
and cholera. The first two took place before 1833, date of the first wave of cholera in 
Spain. It became a prevalent disease from then on, albeit not exclusively. 27 
 
The sea-land cordons depended on the political chief/civil governor, who in turn 
was the central government delegate; specifically from the Ministry of the Interior from 
1834 onwards. Meanwhile, the Provincial Boards of Health had broader functions, but 
with limited administrative capacity; and were also presided over by the civil governor, 
who saw his authority for health intervention enhanced after the General Health Law of 
1855.28 In the second half of the century, the provincial institutions29 were more 
resolutely in favour of cordons than was the central government. The town councils were 
also in favour, despite their reticence when it came to defraying their costs; so much so, 
that until 1834 they conducted their own isolations with the blessing of the higher 
authorities. From this date onwards they did not hesitate to break the law when they 
believed it necessary to set up local cordons, as we shall see below. However, the 
establishment of sanitary cordons was an unthinkable enterprise without the consent and 
collaboration of the army, which normally acted following recommendations, firstly, of 
the Provincial Board of Health and, then, the Provincial Commission. What is more, as 
time went by, this bond increased significantly. 
The treatment of space is the first aspect in the militarisation of the cordons. 
Mallorca was considered as a single unit, whose perimeter had to be preserved from the 
illegal entry of persons and goods30; yet, in turn, the island was divided into areas of 
action in order to make the most of the resources available, both human and material, 
civilian and military. Thus, from the early 1800s a division into military districts called 
‘partidas’ was produced in 1818. On this date only four were established: Llucmajor 
(southern coast), Artà (eastern coast), Pollença (northern coast) and Andratx (western 
coast), with one commander and his troops in charge of each one. On 16 August 1821, 
because of the threat of yellow fever from Barcelona, three cantons were set up, divided 
in turn into eight districts, each with their respective military company. 
The outer cordon, which was installed in 1833, was based on the division of the 
island into four parts, corresponding to the four coastal axes (fronts) that made up its 
geography, and these were divided into thirteen different maritime districts. Each of the 
four island fronts was under a high-ranking officer and each district was under another 
officer with the rank of Captain or above, along with three subordinate officers. A 
                                                          
27 Pere Salas Vives, ‘Cordons sanitaris (Mallorca, 1787-1899)’ [Sanitary cordons (Majorca, 1787 
– 1899)], Gimbernat, 37 (2002), 55-82 and Pere Salas Vives, ‘Libertad y/o derecho a la vida. El 
resguardo sanitario durante el primer liberalismo (Mallorca, siglo XIX)’ [Freedom and/or right to 
life. Sanitary protection during the first liberalism) (Mallorca, siglo XIX)] Historia Social, 68 
(2010), 69-85. 
28 Vilar, op. cit. (note 15).  
29 These institutions also belonged to the Civil Government, the Provincial Delegation, the 
Provincial Council until 1868 and the Provincial Commission from 1870 (Arturo Cajal Valero, 
El Gobernador Civil y el Estado centralizado del siglo XIX [The Civil Governor and the 
Centralizing State in the 19th century ] (Madrid: Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas, 1999). 
30Logically the setting up of sanitary cordons is a reaction by the authorities to the ordinary 
inability to avoid the entry and exit of goods and persons from a territory outside the law; that is, 
contraband. To a certain extent, the cordons make up for the ordinary inability to enforce the law 
with extraordinary measures. Following these criteria, Peter Baldwin, ‘Beyond Weak and Strong: 
Rethinking the State in Comparative Policy History’, The Journal of Policy History, 17-1 (2005), 
12-33) considers that certain states, such as Great Britain, had a much lesser need for 
extraordinary measures of sanitary isolation because the law was much more internalised and 
adhered to than in other states such as Prussia. 
maritime cordon was also established. It is worth noting that, in both cases, it was the 
Captain General of the Balearic Islands, Juan Antonio Monet, who also held the post of 
president of the Superior Board of Health, who gave the order to set up the cordons on 26 
September 1833.31 
In 185432 practically the same land division was maintained as in 1833, although 
the fronts were now called districts and the former districts, cantons, and, instead of 
thirteen, there were twelve; they were also under the charge of military officers whose 
duty it was to cover their corresponding sanitary division on a daily basis. Their main 
mission was: 
 
to avoid any disembarkation of goods or persons along the coast, the heads of 
districts and commanders of cantons shall devote all their efforts to keep the most 
exquisite in all positions.33 
 
Different surveillance points were placed in each canton, which in turn could be grouped 
in blocks, as happened in Palma. It is important to point out that the municipalities in each 
canton were supposed to cooperate with the army, as shall be further explained in the 
following section. 
On 15 August 1885, the Captain General of the Balearics communicated to the 
Delegation that two days later five infantry companies belonging to the Philippines 
Regiment would leave the capital, ‘to station themselves on the points of the island’ 
namely Andratx (western coast), Sóller (northeast coast), Artà (eastern coast), Pollença 
(northern coast) and Santanyí (southern coast).34 Hence, the compartmentalisation of the 
space to conform to military requirements was constant throughout the whole period. It 
is worth noting that this military division of the island did not correspond to any other 
pre-existing division of a civil nature. Mallorca was not considered an administrative 
subject, as it belonged to the province of the Balearic Islands, at the head of which was 
the civil governor. Meanwhile, the town councils, even the City Council in the capital, 
had no authority beyond their municipal territory. Therefore, the militarised territory of 
the sanitary cordons appears as a new space created because of a threat, a theoretically 
exceptional one, but one which repeatedly transformed the existing political, institutional 
and administrative reality. 
Not only were the cordons directed and coordinated by the military establishment, 
who were able to transform the territory at their convenience, but throughout the 1800s 
the enterprise became increasingly monopolised by the army to the detriment of civilian 
personnel and municipal participation, through a process that we can also call 
                                                          
31 Their regulation was published on the same date, 26 September 1833, in a leaflet entitled 
Disposiciones sanitarias y de higiene pública que deben observarse en estas Islas con motivo de 
la proximidad del cólera – morbo [Sanitary and public hygiene provisions that must be observed 
in these Islands due to the proximity of cholera](Palma: Impreso por Felipe Guasp, impresor real, 
1833)  
32 The first record of the existence of a coastal sanitary cordon in the municipal records of the 
capital is not found until the middle of August, whereas their effective withdrawal was from 22 
December 1854. 
33 ‘… evitar todo desembarco de efectos, ni de personas en la costa, los gefes de los distritos y 
comandantes de cantones dedicarán todo su conato á que se guarde la más esquisita [sic] en todos 
los puestos’. From article 6 of the ‘Instrucciones á los gefes de distrito y comandantes de cantones, 
que forman el cordón sanitario del litoral de esta isla’ (1854), quoted by Pujadas-Mora, Las 
epidèmies invisibles i visibles de còlera a la ciutat de Palma. 
34AGCM, Establishment of the Sanitary Cordon S-III-262/2  
professionalisation. In the first cases analysed in Mallorca, the model that can be observed 
must be considered mixed, typical of the eighteenth century; that is, there is co-
participation between civilian and military personnel, although always directed by the 
latter. Thus, in 1794, the cordons had to be carried out according to the authorities,  
 
namely in the outer ring six coastguard boats manned by five sailors, one skipper 
with a health corporal and a sergeant from the garrison troops and in the inner ring 
double the guards and tower keepers and the practice of sea rounds under the 
responsibility of the boroughs.35  
 
Therefore, the terrestrial cordon was de facto under the responsibility of the town councils 
and of the civilians in charge.  
The primacy of the civilian sector in the first cordons of the century, despite 
military tutelage, can be evidenced in the cordon of 1800, when it is pointed out 
 
that to cordon off Palma we shall proceed according to the model initiated during 
the plague of Marseilles in 1720. That is, based on civilian personnel but with 
troops at the ready: making sure to have some practical people among them, on 
the respective coasts.36  
 
Only a few years later, in 1813 and 1817, the employment of ground troops 
already seems to be totally clear; at this time retired military officers are ordered to visit 
the towers and secret guards37 even though at this date the civilian districts organised by 
the municipalities throughout Mallorca persisted.38 The presence of soldiers in the land 
cordons is no longer subsidiary, although they are still a minority with respect to civilians. 
A much more spectacular change took place during the liberal triennium (1820-
1823), a period in which Mallorca was affected by an epidemic of the plague in the region 
of Levante (east coast) (Son Servera, Capdepera and Artà) in 1820 and by a yellow fever 
epidemic in Palma in 1821. In the former, the land army not only made up part of the two 
sanitary cordons established (the outer one that covered the whole of the coast and the 
inner one that isolated the affected area), but the number of their troops was greater than 
ever. A troop of a thousand men came to be used just for the inner cordon, a number 
clearly superior to the four hundred infantry civilians and the forty odd cavalrymen who 
were also used.39 Besides, the artillery was placed on the perimeter of the area and help 
was requested of the General Captaincy of Catalonia, in order to increase military 
presence.40 
If we move on from the purely quantitative to the qualitative aspect, it also 
becomes apparent that militarisation not only involved a greater presence of soldiers, but 
                                                          
35 ‘...a saber en lo exterior seis barcas guardacostas y tripuladas con cinco Marineros un Patrón 
con cavo de Sanidad y un Sargento de la tropa de Guarnición y en lo interior la duplicación de 
guardas y torreros y la práctica de Rondas marítimas al cargo de las villas.’; AMP, Health-Orders: 
2899: 20-6-1794.  
36 ‘que para el acordonamiento de Palma se procederá según el modelo iniciado durante la peste 
de Marsella de 1720. Es decir, en base al personal civil, pero con la tropa preparada: procurando 
poner en ellas alguna gente practica (sic) en las respectivas costas’. AMP, Health-Orders: 2899.  
37 AMP, Health-Orders: 2899: 27-8-1817.  
38 AMP, Health-Orders 2899.  
39 Joana Sureda Trujillo, La pesta de 1820 a Son Servera, Artà i Capdepera [The plague of 1820 
in Son Servera, Artà and Capdepera] (Palma de Mallorca: El Tall editorial, 1993).  
40 AMP, Health-Orders 1681. 
also that healthcare itself was increasingly understood in terms of military districts. The 
documentation of the time clearly reveals a discourse in which the state of war produced 
by the plague epidemic is made clear. This is a real battle that must be won at all costs.41 
Most important is the fact that this was not a transitory situation, but rather the repeated 
threat resulting from the arrival of cholera in Europe reproduced in successive years 
coercive measures to avoid the illegal entry of goods and persons. Furthermore a whole 
series of measures was introduced that affected citizens’ way of life. For instance, in 1854 
the civil governor made known to the mayors that: 
 
Whoever infringes the maritime sanitary cordon already set up, or the land cordon 
that has been ordered today to be set up, not being forced to do so by storms at sea 
which oblige them to enter ports, inlets or coves, but without jumping over this 
onto land or breaking the land cordon, shall be considered a malicious threat to 
public health, be apprehended and punished with extraordinary prison sentences, 
and even death should disease-carrying items of any sort be introduced.42  
 
During these years, the participation of civilians still remained very high, as shown 
by the fact that in 1821 a watch of four civilians was appointed to each coastal defence 
tower, one of whom had to perform the functions of commander; curiously, these were to 
                                                          
41 Specifically on 28 June 1820, and 'In view of the horrifying results of the contagion of Son 
Servera and Artà it was declared: Whoever breaks the cordon, or tries to do so, shall be shot on 
the spot. If they were to escape and the events were proved, they shall be condemned to death 
within 24 hours. All those who have left Son Servera, Artà, Sant Llorenç or Capdepera after 19 
May and have not presented themselves to the justices without justification shall be condemned 
to death. If any of the guards or watchmen, out of negligence, allow anyone to pass, they shall 
also be condemned to death. The cordon troop is at war and is up against an enemy. It must be 
held, as has been stated with the full force of the law, that the troops and other persons employed 
in the cordon of any sort who are in the campaign, at war and facing the enemy, it is hereby 
declared, that they are all subject to the penal laws provided for these cases in the general orders 
of the Army…’ (‘En vista de los horrorosos estragos del contagio de Son Servera y Artà se 
declaraba: El que rompa el cordón, o lo intente, será fusilado en el acto. Si consigue escapar y se 
prueban los hechos, será condenado a muerte en 24 horas. Todos los que hayan salido de Son 
Servera, Artà, Sant Llorenç y Capdepera después del 19 de mayo y no se hayan presentado a las 
justicias sin justificación serán condenados a muerte. Si algunos de los guardias o vigilantes, por 
negligencia, dejan pasar a alguien, también serán condenados a muerte. La tropa del cordón está 
en pie de guerra y enfrenta a un enemigo. Debiéndose reputar como se ha dicho con todo el rigor 
de la ley, que las tropas y demás personas empleadas en el cordón de cualquier clase que sean 
están en servicio de campaña, en función de guerra y al frente del enemigo, se declara, que todos 
están sujetos a leyes penales prevenidas para estos casos en las ordenanzas generales del 
Ejército...’), AMP, Health-Orders-1681. 
42 (‘Todo el que infringiere el cordón sanitario marítimo ya establecido, ó el terrestre que desde 
hoy se manda establecer, no siendo obligado por razón de tempestades en el mar que lo fuercen á 
entrar en puertos, ensenadas ó calas, pero sin saltar por esto en tierra ó romper el cordón terrestre, 
será considerado como atentador malicioso contra la salud pública, aprhendido [sic] y castigado 
con penas extraordinarias de presidio, y hasta con la muerte si introdujese artículos contumaces 
de cualquier clase que sean.’) ‘Likewise, in the same order, meetings in village squares were also 
banned, especially at night, even those of a festive nature; people were obliged to clean the streets 
and squares, water tanks, as well as all public and private establishments; and pig, sheep and goat 
breeding was also banned in the towns; whilst all manure storage pits had to disappear; lastly, the 
councils had to appoint sanitary commissions authorised to watch over public health and to carry 
out visits to private homes and public establishments’, AMLl, Correspondence-26, 5-8-1854. 
be preferably churchmen or ‘wealthy’ people.43 Moreover, it would seem that the 
civilians at that time were paid a wage for taking part in the cordons, which, according to 
the news available, did not happen prior to 1817, when participation was similar to a 
blood tax. This fact did not exclude the use of unpaid civilians at exceptional times. In 
fact, in 1820 the mayors were ordered to send wealthy civilians who could support 
themselves without pay to the cordon of Son Servera (eastern coast).44 Neither did this 
mean that from that time on the districts under the responsibility of the municipalities 
disappeared. Thus, in 1822 an order was issued that the troop patrols had to interact with 
those made up of civilians organised by the local boards of health;45 even though these 
had their days numbered. 
From this last year onwards, the presence of the army was even more decisive in 
setting up the cordons. The disappearance of the ‘sea rounds run by the boroughs’ and 
their replacement by soldiers was the most outstanding, as happened in the cordon of 
1828. Even so, the aforementioned patrols were reinforced with armed civilians, directly 
integrated into the army’s chain of command.46 Therefore, an increase in the military 
nature of the isolations is found, but without the complete disappearance of civilian 
personnel therein. 
As the century advances, the role of civilians becomes a subsidiary force or 
reinforcement for cordons that are basically military in both nature and practice. Civilians 
were used only as a response to the insufficient number of soldiers garrisoned in the 
island. We see this in 1834, when the defensive ring was initiated, exclusively with 
soldiers, and it was not until the month of November when seventy-eight civilians were 
incorporated in order to reinforce the coast, from Felanitx (south-eastern coast) to 
Pollença (northern coast).47 In fact, from the date of the arrival of cholera, the sanitary 
rings were above all almost exclusively military, even though at the time the mobilisation 
of part of the civilian population was necessary. This was due to the limited number of 
soldiers garrisoned in Mallorca and/or to the warfare needs of the time, always allowing 
for the precariousness of the finances of the Spanish State. Furthermore, the incorporation 
of civilians would also take on a much more professional aspect than in the immediate 
past, as it was not a compulsory, unpaid service similar to that at the turn of the century, 
but rather voluntary and paid. 
The initial cordon created in 1849 was composed of military personnel. Civilians 
began to be incorporated temporarily from 8 December, because some of the troops were 
required to be sent to the mainland. In fact, on the 14th of the same month, civilians were 
once again relieved by soldiers,48 proof of the exceptional nature of their presence. During 
                                                          
43 AMP, Health-Orders-1681. 
44 AMP, Health-Orders -1681: 5-6-1820. 
45 AMP, Health-Orders - 1681: 01-6-1822. 
46 For instance, the Military Government of Alcúdia said to the mayor of this town that ‘According 
to the Health Board, with soldiers under my command and with civilians, a sanitary cordon on 
the maritime coast of the district of this town has been established and all the points where 
landings could be made, considering the nature of the land, have been taken (...) the same has 
been verified in the cordon in Pollença, according to an official notice which with twenty men I 
sent to said borough...’ From the original quotation: “De acuerdo con la Junta de Sanidad con 
soldados de los de mi mando y con paysanos, queda establecido un Cordón de Sanidad en la Costa 
marítima del distrito de esta ciudad y tomados todos los puntos que vista la naturaleza del terreno 
se pueden hacer desembarcos en ellos [...] lo mismo se ha verificado en la de Pollensa, según un 
aviso de un oficial que con veinte hombres mandé a dicha villa...” (ARM, JPS Correspondence 
95: 30-9-1828). 
47 AMP, Health-Orders 1681: 11-11-1834. 
48 AMLl, Correspondence 25. 
the cholera outbreak in 1865, the cordon was completely militarised, with the exclusive 
participation of ‘army forces, tower keepers, coastguards, border guards and Guardia 
Civil’.49 That is, at this time there are also members of the recently created police forces 
involved, such as the Guardia Civil, and, of course, the border guards, making up in part 
for the tower keeper corps that had been closed down since 1866. Be that as it may, the 
following year we once again find civilians hired by the municipalities to perform 
surveillance tasks at certain points along the coast;50 and all the indications are that in 
1867 their participation was even greater. In this situation, intense, repeated protests by 
the population break out in many towns due to the difficulties created by the use of their 
residents in surveillance tasks.51 This reflected their opposition to their participation as it 
was considered obsolete, ineffective and damaging to the community, in which residents 
had become citizens with recognised rights.  
This model, which began in 1828 and must be considered military in nature, 
reinforced with militarised civilians, would be maintained practically until the beginning 
of the 1880s. After and including 1884, there are no further references to the presence of 
civilians in the sanitary cordons set up in Mallorca. It could be thought, therefore, that 
from this time onwards militarisation had been completed. It marks the end of a 
progressive tendency towards the participation of the army in extraordinary healthcare, 
initiated at the beginning of our period. We do not believe it is possible to separate this 
from the development of the central State in Spain and its delegated institutions, which is 
typical of the European context in the second half of the nineteenth century.52 In turn, it 
also illustrates the rise in functional specialisation, social complexity and 
interdependencies among members of society.53 
 
The persistence of municipal participation 
 
Paradoxically, the progressive centralisation and rationalisation of the sanitary 
cordons did not eliminate the participation of the municipal and provincial administration 
therein. What is more, although their importance was on the wane, both town councils 
and the delegation continued to be essential to ensure their effectiveness. 
Firstly, it is worth remembering that, in the first decades of the century, coastal 
municipalities were in charge of organising the land rounds in the cordons. Both their 
members and their maintenance on the ground were wholly supplied by all of the 
                                                          
49 AGCM, Establishment of Sanitary Cordon S III 249/33. 
50 AGCM, Establishment of Sanitary Cordon S III 249/33. 
51 AGCM, Establishment of Sanitary Cordon S III 249/37. 
52 At this point, emphasis should be placed on the ‘bureaucratisation’ of the public health 
administration during the first liberal-fusionist governments of the Restoration, the case of the 
Royal Decree of 1886 whereby the Marine Health Corps was created (Jorge Molero Mesa and 
Isabel Jiménez Lucena, ‘Salud y burocracia en España. Los cuerpos de sanidad nacional (1855-
1951)’ [Health and bureaucracy in Spain, The national health corps], Revista Española de Salud 
Pública, 74-007 (2000), 45-53) and the creation of the aforementioned figure of provincial 
inspectors, and also of family doctors in the municipal field (Carmen Barona Vilar, ‘Organización 
y profesionalización de la asistencia médica domiciliaria en los pueblos de la provincia de 
Valencia: 1854-1936’[Organisation and professioinalization of home healthcare in the towns in 
the province of Valencia], in J. L. Barona Vilar (ed.), Polítiques de salut en l'àmbit municipal 
valencià (1850-1936) (València: Seminari d'Estudis Sobre la Ciència, 2000), 13-70.  
53 Norbert Elias, El proceso de la civilización. Investigaciones sociogenéticas y psicogenéticas 
[The process of civilization. Sociogenetic and psychogenetic research studies] (Madrid: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1987). 
boroughs in the island.54 The municipality also constituted the mechanisms necessary to 
connect the higher authorities with the population. This remained as an essential aspect 
in order to put these orders into practice.55 During the plague of 1820, the town councils 
became highly involved in the various cordons, but under the direct orders of the higher 
authorities, whether military or civilian. The mayors had to place the resources of their 
respective municipalities at the service of isolation measures, thereby helping to solve the 
need for men and material that the outer and inner cordons required.  
Nevertheless, even after the disappearance of the civilian rounds and their 
replacement by the army, the municipalities continued to perform two primordial 
functions: firstly, they supplied the personnel that the troops lacked until 1884; and 
secondly, they took charge of their food and lodging needs, as well as making a special 
payment called a ‘bonus’.56 In short, it can be said that the cost of the cordons was 
defrayed by the town councils, upon which all the extraordinary expenditure claimed by 
the military or the civilians themselves fell, whenever they were required. They also had 
to pay for the costs to the State, for the use of the army. The reason for this formula lies 
in the fact that the cordons were considered an issue exclusive to Mallorca and, as a result, 
could not be defrayed by the provincial institutions with jurisdiction throughout the 
archipelago (Balearic Islands); neither could they be covered by the Ministry of War alone 
because it did not have the funds to take on extraordinary expenses, since the activity in 
question was not qualified as strictly military.57 
Not surprisingly, problems relating to financing and organisation appeared. The 
former emerged as soon as the municipalities on the coast were required to supply funds 
needed to establish the cordon, as there was no type of budget envisaged in any institution 
in the province for this purpose. This fact sparked off real problems in the early years. 
Hence, at certain points along the coast during the cordon of 1828, the soldiers’ situation 
was deplorable due to the neglect they suffered by the local authorities.58 Only after the 
coastal municipalities were guaranteed repayment, through a general sharing out with all 
the municipalities in the island, of the money and the material advanced to the soldiers 
did surveillance return to normal.59 This model of action was to be reproduced until the 
end of the century. The degree of acceptance was fairly widespread, and problems with 
the troops mostly disappeared in practice. However, this did not mean there was no longer 
any tension between inland and coastal town councils. 
In fact, the difficulties with municipal finances worsened as the century advanced. 
This was mostly due to the large number of functions, other than health, that had to be 
carried out at the expense of the central government. There is no doubt that this situation 
                                                          
54 AMP, Health-Orders-2899, 20-6-1794. On this topic, the defensive model introduced during 
the Old Regime in Mallorca in response to the corsair threat was followed (Miquel Deyà, Antoni 
Mas and Ramon Rosselló, Història d'Alcúdia. El segle XVI (Alcúdia: Ajuntament d'Alcúdia, 
1999) [History of Alcudia. Sixteenth century]. 
55 For this issue, see Concepción de Castro, La Revolución Liberal y los municipios españoles 
(1812-1868) [The Liberal Revolution and Spanish municipalities] (Madrid: Alianza, 1979) and 
Pedro Carasa Soto (ed.), Ayuntamiento, Estado y Sociedad. Los poderes municipales en la España 
contemporánea [Council, State and Society. Municipal powers in contemporary Spain]. 
(Valladolid: Fundación Municipal de Cultura - Instituto de Historia "Simancas", 2000). 
56 AGCM, Establishment of Sanitary Cordon S III 262/1: 24-9-1884.  
57 AMLl, Correspondence 29, 18-8-1885. 
58 Proof of this assertion were the difficulties of all sorts experienced by the troops stationed in 
Santa Margalida in 1828 (ARM, JPS Correspondence 95: 30-09-1828). 
59 Likewise, the municipalities had to be concerned with building barracks and providing wood 
for the soldiers, avoiding harming private interests, with the corresponding receipt, proof that they 
were recoverable amounts (AMP, Health-Orders 1681, 24-10-1834). 
left the local authorities with little leeway to cope with extraordinary obligations, above 
all if these, in practice, became almost commonplace, as was the case of the policy of 
sanitary isolation. Hence, it is not surprising that payment of the respective distribution 
shares was nearly always overdue, thereby further exacerbating the position of the 
municipalities that had advanced the payments.60 Besides, from the moment when civilian 
participation in the surveillance tasks became subsidiary to the troops, and in the absence 
of general regulations, it was normally the residents of the coastal towns who completed 
the cordon. In 1854, because of the complaints about this situation which was considered 
unfair, such as the one lodged by Manacor town council (coastal municipality in the east 
of Mallorca) in September 1854, the governor of the province published a memo on 22 
October of that year establishing the number of residents that should be provided by 
inland towns and the surveillance point on the coast where they were to settle. Even so, 
after the total withdrawal of the troops on 15 November, only residents from Manacor 
took charge of the cordon without being able to receive any help from the inland towns. 
61  
The unsatisfactory operation of this system led in 1865 to the introduction of 
advance sharing out of the possible costs of setting up a cordon. This idea failed due to 
the legal incapacity of the provincial government to make the town councils enforce 
expenditures that did not figure in their budgets. This situation also highlighted the 
limitations of institutions to deal with financing actions which, paradoxically, were 
considered vital for health maintenance. The situation cannot have been very clear when 
in 1890, at the request of several councils, the Provincial Commission of the Delegation 
had to point out that  
 
The forces that are providing the service of the sanitary cordon must be paid in 
cash from the Custodian of Provincial Funds the bonus which for this purpose has 
been assigned to them, and therefore even though the Council, in compliance with 
what is provided in the article of the instruction dated 9 August 1877, is obliged 
to provide them with the livelihood and utensils they need, the value of all the 
goods supplied must be reimbursed by the Military Administration in the form 
provided for in the aforementioned instruction.62 
 
However, despite the lack of solidarity that tended to reign among the inland and coastal 
boroughs, the problems did not become so serious as to prevent the establishment of any 
cordon nor to undermine their effectiveness.  
                                                          
60 AMLl, Municipal Records: 29-01-1850; AMMo, Municipal Records: 07-2-1850; AMA, 
Municipal Records: 24-5-1874; AMLl, Municipal Records: 02-8-1874; AMC, Municipal 
Records: 29-7-1865; AMMo, Municipal Records: 12-4-1892 o, entre otros, AMLl, Municipal 
Records: 14-03-1894. Curiously, in January 1888 the Council of Andratx (western coast) refused 
to pay the part corresponding to the prison in their judicial district, until they had been reimbursed 
the advances made due to the sanitary cordon two years previously (AMA, Municipal Records: 
15-1-1888).  
61 AMM, Municipal Records: 22-9-1854, 19-10-1854 y 12-11-1854.  
62 “Las fuerzas que están prestando el servicio del cordón sanitario deben percibir en metálico de 
la Depositaria de la Fondos provinciales el plus que con este motivo les ha sido señalado, y por 
lo tanto si bien los Ayuntamiento en cumplimento de lo dispuesto en el artº de la instrucción de 9 
de Agosto 1877 vienen obligados á subministrarles las subsistencias y utensilios que necesiten el 
valor de todas las especies que subministren deberá serles reintegrado por la Administración 
Militar en la forma que previene la citada instrucción.” (AGCM, Establishment of Sanitary 
Cordon S-III-246/31, 9-9-1890). 
In addition, in spite of the extraordinary expense the army caused to local revenue 
offices, its participation was increasingly requested by the municipal administrations 
themselves. It was not from the direct intervention of the citizens. Perhaps this was 
because they were supposed to earn a wage which, in the end, was also covered by 
corporation taxes, while the normal development of economic activity was reduced to a 
large extent. Yet, above all, the use of volunteers was avoided and progress was made in 
the militarisation of the isolations. In fact, in the cordons following 1884, no council 
raised its voice against the payment in cash of the quotas aimed at financing an 
exclusively army service nor against the way of sharing this out among municipalities. 
 
Consensus and demands for sanitary cordons 
 
Throughout the period studied an important consensus evolved in favour of the 
cordons run on behalf of the provincial and local authorities, the population at large, and 
the medical class, with some exceptions in 1865 as we shall see immediately below. 
Initially, we might expect the opposite, as preventive medicine, unlike curative medicine, 
in order to become accepted63 has traditionally required a high degree of coercion64 or 
demand and mobilisation by specific sectors of the population. The reasons why in 
Mallorca this did not happen are certainly diverse. One of them could be its inclusion in 
a long tradition dating back to the Middle Ages,65 with the result of adopting isolation as 
a normal action in the face of an epidemic threat.66 Nor were there significant 
discrepancies within the medical establishment concerning the adoption of this type of 
measures, but rather a predominance of a sort of eclecticism between contagionism and 
hygienism when it came down to proposing anti-epidemic measures.67 Only from the start 
                                                          
63 In England and in the United States, for instance, the population was much more in favour of 
contagionism and, therefore, of sanitary cordons than the public authorities and the medical class 
(George Davey Smith, ‘Commentary: Behind the Broad Street pump: aetiology, epidemiology 
and prevention of cholera in mid-nineteenth-century Britain’, International Journal of 
Epidemiology, 31 (2002), 920-932). 
64 Vicente Pérez Moreda, Las crisis de mortalidad en la España Interior (siglos XVI-XIX) [The 
mortality crises in Inland Spain (Seventeenth – nineteenth centuries]. (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1980), 
418  
65 In 1867, for instance, the provincial government justified the establishment of the sanitary 
cordon 'which is so deeply rooted in this island and which public opinion calls for in similar 
circumstances as one of the most efficient models’, as well as other considerations (‘en la que se 
halla tan arraigada en esta isla y que la opinión pública reclama en semejantes circunstancias 
como uno de los medios más eficaces’) (AGCM, Establishment of sanitary cordon S-III-249/33: 
13-8-1867).  
66 Evidently this is not a characteristic exclusive to Mallorca, as noted by Carlo M. Cipolla, Contra 
un enemigo mortal e invisible [Against a mortal, invisible enemy] (Barcelona: Crítica, 1993): 93 
and Eugenia Tognotti, ‘Lessons from the History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A’, 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 19 (2013), 254-259, the isolation system had a long tradition in 
Southern Europe and, specifically, in Northern Italy and in the Italian islands.  
67 Not all countries acted in the same way, as demonstrated in the successive international sanitary 
conferences from 1851 on (Valeska Huber, ‘The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The 
international Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851-1894’, The Historical Journal, 49, 2 (2006), 
453-476 and Josep Lluis Barona Vilar and Josep Bernabeu-Mestre, La salud y el Estado. El 
movimiento sanitario internacional y la administración española (1851-1945) [Health and the 
State. The international sanitary movement and the Spanish administration] (València: 
Publicacions de la Universitat de València, 2008). Although it is true that eclecticism was not an 
isolated case in Mallorca but rather much more widespread than had been thought to date 
(Christopher Hamlin, ‘Commentary: Ackerknecht and ‘Anticontagionism’: a tale of two 
of the twentieth century did medical science and public health shelve coastal sanitary 
cordons, when they were replaced by other kinds of protective measures.  
Proof of this consensus is provided by the behaviour of the town councils over the 
period studied. Not only did they participate in the organisation and funding of the 
sanitary cordons as we have seen, but they also demanded their establishment and even 
cordoned off their own towns on the five occasions (1820, 1821, 1854, 1865 and 1870)68 
that an epidemic had affected some part of the island. It is worth noting that, as of 1855, 
these measures were blatantly illegal, contrary to before this date, when the councils were 
even exhorted by the higher authorities to proceed with their own cordons. Indeed, this is 
exactly what happened during the plague of 1820, a time when the local authorities 
responded to this call with great zeal. Yet perhaps the most extreme situation was 
experienced in September 1821. In order to concentrate on the isolation of the city of 
Palma, the Superior Board of Health withdrew troops from their respective districts. Once 
yellow fever had been declared in the capital this forced the municipalities to defend 
themselves with their own forces, both in the outer and inner rings.69 What is more, on 
30 October, 1,660 men were summoned from the ‘Part Forana’ (Rest of Mallorca beyond 
Palma)70 to reinforce the cordon in Palma.71  
From now on, the town councils did not hesitate to demand isolationist measures 
whenever another epidemic threatened to arrive in the island. Nor were they reluctant 
when it came to collaborating with their own measures, as we have already seen. This 
predisposition may also have been due to their own experience learnt from the two 
aforementioned epidemics in 1820 and 1821. There is no doubt that the arrival of the 
plague in the Eastern region – the most terrible and feared of the epidemics – and, to a 
lesser extent, yellow fever in Palma, acted as a wake-up call for the provincial, local, and 
even central authorities as well as among the population at large. The death of almost two 
thousand people alone in the summer of 1820 confirmed the worst fears of the sanitary 
and political authorities,72 even whilst they were justifying the loss of freedom, justifying 
the disciplinary measures and justifying their high economic cost. They held to this 
position even in the face of the strengthening thesis of those in favour of contagionism, 
beyond any ideological belief. Besides, it is worth recalling that, in the above cases, the 
epidemic was declared in the island before the establishment of the outer cordon. Once 
the isolationist measures had been imposed, they managed to contain the epidemic within 
the initial focal points. Therefore, both cases highlighted the potential danger of the 
                                                          
dichotomies’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 38 (2009), 22-27). At the same time, it is 
important to note that ‘Indeed quarantine and customs border policing, and the cordon sanitaire, 
were crucial places and practices for the emerging political reality of sovereign territory’, as it is 
argued by Alison Bashford, ‘Global Biopolitics and the History of World Health’, History of the 
Human Sciences, 19-1 (2006), 67-88, 70.  
68 Or what is the same, the episodes of the plague in Son Servera (1820), yellow fever in Palma 
(1821), cholera in Andratx and Palma (1854 and 1865 respectively) and yellow fever in Palma in 
1870.  
69 AMP, Health-Orders-1681 (1820-1835/1870), 13-9-1821. The municipalities did not need the 
order to proceed to isolate themselves to be repeated as they had done so a few months previously 
due to the plague in 1820.  
70 Traditionally the island of Mallorca has been divided between the capital (the city of Palma) 
and the rest of the towns located outside the city walls.  
71 AMP, Health-Orders-1681 (1820-1835/1870): 3-10-1821.  
72 In the town of Son Servera the death rate was of the order of 650 per thousand (Jaume Alzina 
Mestre, Població, terra i propietat a la Comarca de Llevant de Mallorca (Segles XVII/XIX-XX) 
[Population, land and property in the Eastern Region of Mallorca (seventeenth – twentieth 
centuries]) (Artà: Ajuntament d'Artà, 1993).  
epidemic threat at a time of progress and predisposed society at large to be favourably 
inclined towards prophylactic and coercive measures, in addition to stimulating the 
increase in public hygiene. 
It is not surprising that, from now on, as well as demanding the establishment of 
cordons, the town councils themselves did not hesitate to supplement personnel from their 
own resources whenever the army contribution was insufficient. For instance in 1849, 
due to the demobilisation decreed by the central government, the civil governor had no 
problem with the municipalities substituting civilians for soldiers that to that date had 
made up part of the cordon. What is more, the mayors were urged: 
 
you will seek to achieve the best harmony between the civilian posts and the ones 
occupied by the troops by helping each other mutually and passing on notice of 
any new development to the military command who, being more experienced in 
this sort of service, are able to proceed with greater success in any unexpected 
event.73  
 
In 1866, at a meeting called by the Provincial Commission itself, attended by the mayors 
and local elite in order to find out ‘the opinion and will of the country with respect to the 
surveillance cordon measure on the coasts of Mallorca’, it was unanimously agreed that 
‘there would be a cordon’, and that it would be made up ‘of the army forces, tower 
keepers, coastguards, border guards and Guardia Civil’.74 Decades later, the councils 
again spoke out in favour of the cordons, even when they had to take on the extra numbers 
demanded by the army, as we have already seen. In addition, some town councils, such 
as Sant Joan (centre of the island), reported through official channels ‘that it sees with 
great pleasure the measures that are being taken to free from contagion…’.75  
However, perhaps the clearest stance on behalf of the population of Mallorca in 
favour of the cordons was produced as a result of the declaration of cholera in 1865 and 
yellow fever in 1870 in Palma. In the first case, the new governor Adolfo García de León 
y Pizarro who had arrived in the island on 27 August 1865, issued almost immediately a 
series of clearly anti-contagionist measures to curb the spread of cholera in the island. 
These included the reduction of the number of soldiers devoted to the outer cordon, 
preventing the isolation of Palma when several cases of cholera had already been 
declared. Following the law of 1855, he reiterated the prohibition of self-isolation of the 
boroughs even though most of them set this in motion. In fact, they were doing nothing 
less than following the identical pattern of behaviour in the previous cases of epidemics 
in Mallorca. The response of the mayors in the rest of Mallorca outside Palma was blunt: 
they refused to obey and kept up their cordons. This led to an initial, certainly interesting, 
memo from the Governor in the following terms:  
 
Therefore, being unable to believe that the intention of the local authorities who 
are involved in the aforementioned case was to rebel against the law, given the 
proverbial loyalty of the Balearic people, but rather that they will have obeyed 
their natural instinct in view of the unjustified alarm caused by the part of this 
                                                          
73 ‘procurarán que reine la mejor armonia entre los puestos de paisanos y los que ocupe la tropa 
ausiliándose mutuamente y pasando aviso de cualquiera novedad á los gefes militares que mas 
esperimentados en esta clase de servicio se hallen en el caso de proceder con mayor acierto en 
cualquier ocurrencia.’AMLl, Correspondence-25, 4-12-1849. 
74 AGCM, Establishment of Sanitary Cordon S-III-249/33: 28-8-1866. 
75 AMC, Municipal Records-1285: 28-09-1884 y AGCM, Establishment of Sanitary Cordon S-
III-262/2: 31-8-1885). 
community which has fled, I expect the mayors to whom I am referring, in view 
of the aforementioned legal precept and being better informed of the sanitary state 
of this city, to immediately take down the sanitary cordon, on the understanding 
that if this were not verified I will be obliged to adopt rulings that I wish to avoid.76 
 
Despite its forcefulness, we have evidence that the order had little effect. The evidence 
clearly shows that in Inca (centre of the island), Establiments (north of the city of Palma), 
Sóller (north-western coast), Alaró (centre of the island) and Alcúdia (northern coast)77 
strict isolation measures were maintained, while in other municipalities there were 
disputes with the population when their respective councils decided to comply with the 
memos from the Provincial Governor.78 To make matters worse, the press, even the more 
typically progressive press, agreed with the municipalities that rebelled for the 
reestablishment of the cordons.79 
The clash between the mayors and the Governor did not stop until weeks after the 
epidemic had been eradicated. The press, also, echoed the fact that one of the last memos 
in this regard dated 25 September, again ‘strictly’ forbade the mayors and Municipal 
Boards of Health to impose their cordons. This was systematically disobeyed, giving rise 
to a multitude of incidents.80 Finally, it would seem that the highest provincial authority 
gave in. From that time on, its main concern was only to avoid abuses in the quarantines 
and not so much their elimination.81 Meanwhile, as far as the coast is concerned, the army 
did not return to its barracks until 22 October, when danger of the disease entering the 
island had completely disappeared.82 
The stance of the town mayors was similar to that of the Permanent Commission 
of Public Salubriousness made up ad hoc of individuals from the Municipal Board and 
the Provincial Board of Health. This commission expressed its support for setting up a 
land cordon in the Capital. On 18 September news emerged of the commission’s 
agreement regarding the convenience for  
                                                          
76 ‘Por lo tanto y no pudiendo creer que el ánimo de las autoridades locales que se hallan en el 
caso referido, haya sido la de rebelarse contra la ley, toda vez que es proverbial la lealtad de los 
baleares, sino que habrán obedecido al natural instinto en vista de la injustificada alarma de la 
parte de este vecindario que ha huido, espero de los señores Alcaldes á (sic) quienes me refiero, 
en vista del citado precepto legal y mejor informados del estado sanitario de esta ciudad, 
levantarán inmediatamente el cordón sanitario, en la inteligencia que de no verificarlo me veré 
precisado á [sic] adoptar disposiciones que deseo evitar’. Memo from the Government of the 
Province, 29 August 1865 in BOPB nº. 5.129 de 30-08-1865. Also of interest is BOPB, nº. 5.132 
de 25-9-1865. 
77 J. de Oleza y de España, ‘Episodio en la vida de un pueblo. El cólera de 1865 en Palma. La 
Gente balear durante la epidemia. Lazareto, cuarentenas, cordones sanitarios y disposiciones 
legales’, Boletín Estadística Municipal de Palma, 1966, 59, 5-9, 5 [Episode in the life of a people. 
Cholera in 1865 in Palma. The Balearic people during the epidemic].  
78 In fact, in Sineu (centre of the island) for instance, popular protest triggered an extraordinary 
meeting of the Town Council, Municipal Board and leading taxpayers to decide whether the 
cordon was to be raised once again, the resolution of which remains unknown (AMS unicipal 
Records: 1-9-1865). Even more spectacular is the case of Alcúdia (northern coast), where the 
cordon is imposed on 3 November, just after the aforementioned memo from the Governor is 
received (AMA, Municipal Records: 3-9-1865).  
79 El Isleño, 12-9-1865 and Juan Llabrés Bernal, Noticias y relaciones históricas de Mallorca: 
siglo XIX (Palamós: Imprenta Alcover, 1966), 313 [News and historical relations in Mallorca]. 
80 Ibid., 317. 
81 BOP-5132 de 25-9-1865.  
82 AMA, Municipal Records: 22-10-1865. 
 
Palma and boroughs in Mallorca the establishment of a sanitary cordon around the 
city, like the one established in 1821 [episode of yellow fever], interpreting the 
wish of the majority of the inhabitants in the island.83 
 
Interestingly, most published opinion held the view ‘that this measure, rejected by the 
Governor, favoured numerous families who could not find food except at very high 
prices’.84 Note that the press is totally in favour of the contagionist measures. 
Finally, in early 1866 the governor relinquished his duties and his replacement, 
Primitivo Seriñá, had obviously learnt the lesson, as did his successors. They gave up on 
their anti-isolationist stances. In fact, during the episode of yellow fever in Palma in 1870, 
the boroughs went back to isolating themselves with no record of any sort of backlash 







As has already been seen, it is paradoxical that the most radical and extraordinary 
form of sanitary protection, the sanitary cordons, ceased to be an occasional practice 
during the nineteenth century and became something of a norm, with wide social, medical 
and political acceptance. In this sense, Mallorca was the perfect example in the context 
of the Mediterranean area. On the one hand, during the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the application of isolation measures such as quarantines and sanitary cordons was a 
common practice, especially in easily delimited maritime enclaves such as islands or 
peninsulas. Even British colonies like Gibraltar and Malta applied them, as well as Egypt. 
The situation changed after the first International Sanitary Conference in 1851, when only 
Tuscany, the Kingdom of Naples, the Papal States, Greece and Spain retained their use. 
However, from that point on, these measures were softened and rationalised, and the 
establishment of sanitary cordons was restricted and placed under the authority of the 
central government in Spain. In any case, the fact that states carried on controlling their 
ports and applying rationalised quarantines should not be ignored.  
Having said this, it is also true that the case study shows certain peculiarities, 
especially during the second half of the nineteenth century up to 1890. During this period, 
sanitary prevention through the establishment of sanitary cordons held a consensus in 
Mallorca that perhaps was stronger than in other places, even other places in the 
Mediterranean. This fact could be due to both external and internal factors. In the first 
place, even after 1851, experts argued for the effectiveness of sanitary cordons in 
preserving small islands or certain peninsulas with a relatively small perimeter to defend. 
Local history supported this claim, as epidemic threats were kept away from the island 
                                                          
83 ‘Palma y villas de Mallorca el establecimiento de un cordón sanitario en los alrededores de la 
ciudad, como el establecido en 1821 (episodio de fiebre amarilla), interpretando el deseo de la 
mayoría de los habitantes de la isla’, Llabrés Bernal, Noticias y relaciones históricas de Mallorca, 
315. 
84 Ibid., 316.  
85 For instance, Alaró maintained the sanitary cordon from 10 October to 22 November 1870 
(AMAl, Municipal Records: 10-10-1870 and 22-11-1870). Meanwhile, Alcúdia made all new 
arrivals observe five days of quarantine and three days for their goods (AMA, Municipal Records: 
30-10-1870).  
and, when they were not, epidemics were contained thanks to the use of sanitary 
cordons.86 In addition, there was at the time no understanding of the pathological process 
nor, for that matter, any preventive therapies. It is therefore not surprising that Mallorcan 
physicians supported polices based on miasmatic and contagionist theories.  
We need to consider the geographical situation of Mallorca as one of the 
determinants in the extended use of sanitary cordons. The Balearic Islands are located in 
a border area between Africa and Europe, in the commercial routes between the regions. 
In addition, they were well-connected to the East and Latin America. All these places 
were considered potentially dangerous for plague, yellow fever or cholera. Accordingly, 
the perception of danger in Mallorca was permanent and evident, mostly when in 1820 
and 1821, plague and yellow fever severely affected certain areas of the island. At the 
time, it was believed that smugglers from North Africa or from Barcelona had imported 
those diseases. This belief coexisted with the strong presence of plague on the African 
coast of the Mediterranean and cholera on the European coast. Moreover, this period was 
characterised by an increase in commercial traffic and blame laid on Islam and the 
uncivilised East. 
We may believe, therefore, that the use of quarantines and preventative measures 
was vital to ensuring the commercial traffic on which the prosperity of the island and its 
entry into modernity depended. In the absence of other scientific alternatives, the use of 
this kind of measures, even the most radical, endorsed by the local, and partly by the 
international, medical class, was likely to reduce anxiety among Mallorcan commercial 
partners. In this way, although cordons slowed contact it quickly resumed after the 
danger. For this reason, commercial elites could even feel comfortable with the 
contagionist policy as it actually occurred in Mallorca in general. On the other hand, the 
local and provincial liberal authorities had other reasons to adopt an approach that had 
the endorsement of the population and of local scientists. These were none other than to 
ensure social order and stability of public offices, undermined by any epidemic, as 
occurred with the outbreak of cholera in Palma in 1865. At this point, we emphasise that 
the liberal state always prioritised the right to life, and even public order, over individual 
freedom, a fact that was accepted by a majority of the population, as we have seen.87 Only 
when bacteriology proposed truly effective and credible arguments were the cordons 
abandoned. 
At this point, it is worth highlighting the fact that quarantines and sanitary cordons 
not only helped to modernise the island by preserving it from epidemics, thereby 
maintaining the social order, but were also made possible by the emergence of a State and 
provincial and local administrations that were more capable and effective than Old 
Regime institutions. That is, without the progressive bureaucratisation-rationalisation-
militarisation of sanitary cordons during the nineteenth century, they would not have 
proved effective and would have been rapidly discredited. In other words, this case study 
is part of the process of state growth that Michael Mann noted for Western countries 
during this time, as we stated earlier. 
                                                          
86 That was not only true for Mallorca. For other territories, see: E. Tognotti, ‘Lessons from the 
History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A’. 
87 We need to bear in mind that, in Europe, liberalism was implanted in societies in transition 
from the Old Regime, as stated by A. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the 
Great War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). Moreover, the acceptance rather than the 
imposition of a certain biopolitics, implying acceptance of health discipline by the population, 
has already been theorised by M. Foucault; see Patrice Bourdelais, Les épidémies terrassées. Une 
historie des pays riches (París: Éditions de La Martinière, 2003), among others.  
Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that the cordons were successful. There were 
only five epidemic episodes in Mallorca during the nineteenth century, and these affected 
the island only partially. Moreover, the mortality crises lost intensity and extent during 
the same period. This is one more reason to support the contention that coercion in the 
service of preservation of health can attain a high degree of consensus and can also 
predispose society to accept new demands from the State or from medical science. 
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